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Diminished responsibility: jury verdicts and ‘uncontradicted’ psychiatric evidence 
 
R v Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387, Court of Appeal 
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Michael Brennan, 22, worked as a male escort. In May 2013, he sent a text to one of his 
clients, Paul Simons, a 54-year-old divorced antiques dealer, inviting him to visit Brennan at 
a flat in Chelmsford. The flat was rented by Brennan’s boyfriend, who was on holiday at the 
time, and so was otherwise unoccupied. There, Brennan stabbed Simons to death with 
three knives in what was described as a “savage and sustained attack”. The probable cause 
of death was a stab wound that penetrated Simons’ heart to a depth of 15 cm. There was a 
second stab wound to the chest and a blow to the back of his head with a hammer 
(probably inflicted post-mortem). There were a total of 22 stab wounds, mostly to Simons’ 
back, caused while he was lying face down on the floor. Brennan then left the flat and rang 
the police to tell them that he had just killed someone.  
 
Brennan was charged with murder and appeared before Judge Ball QC and a jury at 
Chelmsford Crown Court in December 2013. Brennan had previously offered a plea of guilty 
to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility, but that was rejected by the 
Crown. At the trial, it was undisputed that Brennan had killed Simons and that he had done 
so intentionally. The only defence was diminished responsibility, under s 2, Homicide Act 
1957 (as amended by s 52, Coroners and Justice Act 2009). Giving evidence at the trial, 
Brennan’s mother Angela said that her son had been the subject of homosexual bullying 
after coming out aged 14, and had stones thrown at him by other children. Even before 
then, he had had personality and mental health issues since early childhood. The only expert 
evidence adduced during the trial was from a consultant forensic psychiatrist, Dr Gillian 
Mezey. Her opinion was firmly in support of the defence. She told jurors that Brennan 
suffered from two recognised medical conditions, “Schizotypal Disorder” and “Emotionally 
Unstable Personality Disorder”. Her evidence was based on Brennan’s family, medical and 
personal history and an interview that she had conducted with him two months after the 
killing. She further testified that Brennan’s medical disorder would have substantially 
impaired his ability to form a rational judgment and/or to exercise self-control at the time of 
the killing and finally that his disorder would have been a significant contributory factor in 
causing him to act in the way that he did. Dr Mezey’s testimony was not contradicted by any 
expert evidence adduced by the Crown, which called no expert evidence at all in that 
regard. Nevertheless, the jury convicted of murder. Brennan appealed. 
 
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, that the murder conviction should be quashed and a verdict 
of manslaughter substituted (at [3]). The case involved “two relevant but potentially 
conflicting principles”. First, “in criminal trials cases are decided by juries, not by experts”; 
and second, “juries must base their conclusions on the evidence” (at [43]). Davis LJ said: 
 
“There can… be no room for departure from so fundamental a principle as the 
second principle. It reflects the very essence of the jury system and of a just and 
fair trial. But the first principle, whilst most important and undoubtedly 
descriptive of the general position, is also capable… of admitting of degree of 
qualification in a suitably exceptional case… [S]uppose, for example, a matter 
arises falling exclusively within the domain of scientific expertise; suppose, too, 
that all the well qualified experts instructed on that particular matter are agreed 
as to the correct conclusion and no challenge is made to such conclusion. Can it 
really be said that the jury nevertheless can properly depart from the experts as 
to that conclusion on that particular matter: simply on the basis that it is to be 
said, by way of mantra, that the ultimate conclusion is always for the jury? We 
would suggest not. Where there simply is no rational or proper basis for 
departing from uncontradicted and unchallenged expert evidence then juries 
may not do so.” (at [44]) 
 
Davis LJ pointed out that the present case was the first of its kind to come before the Court 
of Appeal involving the amended version of s 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. He said that the 
new wording of s 2 gave “significantly more scope to the importance of expert psychiatric 
evidence” (at [49]). There was now “essentially” a four-stage test and “most, if not all, of the 
aspects of the new provisions related entirely to psychiatric matters” (at [51]). It was “both 
legitimate and helpful… for an expert psychiatrist to include in his or her evidence a view on 
all four stages, including a view as to whether there was substantial impairment” (at [51]).  
 
Moreover, in a murder trial where the medical evidence supporting diminished 
responsibility was “uncontradicted” and there was no other evidence “capable of rebutting” 
it, the murder charge ought to be withdrawn from the jury (at [65]). It was “unprincipled” 
that a charge of murder should be left to the jury “simply and solely because the 
prosecution wants it to be” (at [66]).  
 
COMMENTARY 
 
Power of the Court of Appeal to overturn jury verdict 
As the Court of Appeal acknowledged, Brennan is the first case to raise a question as to the 
safety of a murder conviction returned in defiance of “uncontradicted and unchallenged” 
expert psychiatric evidence under the amended provisions of s 2, Homicide Act 1957. 
However, it is far from the first such case since 1957. The present case is similar to the 
decisions in R v Matheson [1958] 1 WLR 474, R v Bailey [1961] Crim LR 828; (1978) 66 Cr. 
App. R. 31 and R v Pearce (2000; unreported).  In the first case, Albert Matheson, 52, killed a 
15-year-old boy by hitting him over the head with a water-filled bottle and a claw hammer. 
He then cut the body in half, disembowelled it, and packed the intestines in a suitcase. He 
hid the remains in a sump underneath the St. James’ Boxing Hall in Newcastle before 
handing himself in to the police. At his murder trial, the three medical experts agreed that 
Matheson was suffering a mental abnormality based on retarded development (one of the 
admissible causes of an abnormality of mind under the original s 2). Two of the experts said 
that Matheson’s mental development was that of a boy of 10. No medical evidence was 
given by the prosecution in rebuttal. Despite this, the jury at Durham Assizes rejected the 
defence and Matheson was convicted of murder. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal 
quashed his conviction, substituting one of manslaughter. Lord Goddard CJ said that where 
there was “unchallenged” evidence of medical abnormality (at p. 478) and where “no facts 
or circumstances appear that can displace or throw doubt on that evidence” (at p. 479) then 
the Court was “bound to say that a verdict of murder is unsupported by the evidence” (at p. 
479). The Lord Chief Justice was careful to say that this was not a case of the courts usurping 
the role of the jury: 
 
“The fact is there was unchallenged evidence that this man was within the provisions 
of s 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, and no evidence that he was not. This decision, 
therefore, in no way departs from what has been said in other cases, that the decision 
is for the jury and not for the doctors; it only emphasizes that a verdict must be 
supported by evidence. If there is evidence and a proper direction, this court will not 
usurp the function of the jury, unless, indeed, there is evidence so overwhelming that 
the court comes to the conclusion that though it might be said there was some 
evidence the other way, the verdict would amount to a miscarriage of justice. We base 
our decision on the ground that the evidence in this particular case did not support 
the conviction” (at p. 479) 
 
In Bailey, the appellant had battered a 16-year-old girl to death with an iron bar. Three 
medical experts including a senior prison medical officer agreed that Bailey suffered from 
epilepsy, that he had suffered a fit at the time of the killing, and that it had substantially 
impaired his mental responsibility at that time. However, despite that evidence, the jury at 
Leicester Assizes rejected the defence and Bailey was convicted of murder. He appealed and 
the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed his murder conviction, substituting a verdict of 
manslaughter. Lord Parker CJ said: 
 
“[O]f course juries are not bound by what the medical witnesses say, but at the 
same time they must act on evidence, and if there is nothing before them, no 
facts and no circumstances shown before them which throw doubt on the 
medical evidence, then that is all that they are left with, and the jury, in those 
circumstances, must accept it.” (at p.32) 
 
In Pearce, the appellant had killed a 17-year-old woman with whom he was in a long-term 
relationship. The killing was described as “exceptionally violent” (at [4]). He was charged 
with murder, and his plea of guilty to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility 
was rejected by the Crown. At the trial, two doctors who gave evidence for the defence 
testified that Pearce was suffering from a mental abnormality at the time of the killing as a 
result of a combination of drug-induced psychosis, involving “auditory hallucinations and 
abnormal beliefs”, clinical depression, and low intelligence. Despite this, the jury at 
Wolverhampton Crown Court rejected the defence and convicted Pearce of murder. 
However, the Court of Appeal quashed his conviction and substituted one of manslaughter. 
Swinton Thomas LJ explained that “there was no evidence which could possibly justify a jury 
in coming to a conclusion other than that his responsibility for his actions in killing the 
deceased was substantially diminished” (at [27]). 
 
In Brennan, Davis LJ in the Court of Appeal noted that there had been several other cases 
where juries had returned verdicts of guilty to murder despite expert evidence supporting a 
defence of diminished responsibility, and that these verdicts had been upheld on appeal. 
However, those cases were all distinguishable from Brennan. In the first of these cases, 
Walton v R [1978] AC 788, the accused had pleaded not guilty to murder based on evidence 
of retarded development. However, this was rejected by the jury in the High Court of 
Barbados, who returned a verdict of guilty to murder. The Barbados Court of Appeal and the 
Privy Council both upheld the verdict. Lord Keith described the expert evidence as “not 
entirely convincing” (at p.793). He pointed out that “the jury on occasion may properly 
refuse to accept medical evidence” (at p.793, emphasis added). In Brennan, Davis LJ said 
that “no entirely unqualified right on the part of the jury so to refuse was acknowledged” by 
the Privy Council (at [57], emphasis added).  
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal refused to overturn the jury’s verdict of guilty to murder, 
despite evidence supporting a plea of diminished responsibility in R v Sanders (1991) 93 Cr. 
App. R. 245 and R v Eifinger [2001] EWCA Crim 1855. In the former case, Watkins LJ 
explained that there were “two clear principles” applicable in all diminished responsibility 
cases. The first was that “if there are no other circumstances to consider, unequivocal, 
uncontradicted medical evidence favourable to a defendant should be accepted by a jury 
and they should be so directed” (at p.249). The second was that “where there are other 
circumstances to be considered the medical evidence, though it be unequivocal and 
uncontradicted, must be assessed in the light of the other circumstances” (at p.249). In 
Sanders, the appeal was dismissed because, although there was uncontradicted psychiatric 
evidence of reactive depression, there were “other circumstances” which cast doubt on 
whether the appellant’s mental responsibility was substantially impaired. Specifically, the 
Crown had argued that Sanders involved an “intentional premeditated killing by a man 
overwhelmed with bitterness and jealousy”. Watkins LJ said that “On the evidence as a 
whole the jury were… entitled to reach their verdict” (at p.251). 
 
In Eifinger, although two psychiatrists were prepared to corroborate the defence of 
diminished responsibility, the only evidence of a depressive illness was provided by the 
appellant himself. The appeal court held that the jury was therefore “in a position to decide 
the essential question, namely if there was a depressive illness, could it be described as an 
illness of such severity as to have substantially impaired the appellant’s responsibility for his 
acts?” Latham LJ said that “this court can, and indeed should, interfere where the material 
before the jury really does not support any other conclusion but that the jury must have 
come to a perverse conclusion on the facts” (Eifinger at [19]). However, in the case, the 
appeal court had no “doubt but that the jury understood what their task was and had 
material upon which they could come to the conclusion that they did” (Eifinger at [20]). 
 
Power of the trial judge to withdraw murder from the jury 
In Brennan, Davis LJ emphasised that, while trial judges had the power to withdraw murder 
charges from the jury in diminished responsibility cases, this should not be seen as a 
violation of the “general principle that all criminal trials must be left to be decided by a 
verdict of the jury” (at [64]). Rather, it was “an application of the fundamental principle that 
juries may only properly convict on evidence capable of justifying a conviction” (at [64]). 
Davis LJ said: 
 
“So to say is not… to permit an otherwise impermissible judicial encroachment 
on the proper functions of the jury nor unduly to encroach on the burden of 
proof placed on the defence. Rather, it is to acknowledge that there may be 
cases where the other evidence is, for example, too tenuous or, taken at its 
highest, insufficient (set in the light of the uncontradicted expert evidence) to 
permit a rational rejection of the defence of diminished responsibility… A charge 
of murder should not be left to the jury if the trial judge’s considered view is that 
on the evidence taken as a whole no properly directed jury could properly 
convict of murder” (at [65 – 66]). 
 
The decision in Brennan was based on various statements made in R v Khan [2009] EWCA 
Crim 1569, [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. 4; [2010] Crim LR 136. In that case, Aikens LJ said: 
 
“[T]here may be very exceptional cases where the defence of diminished 
responsibility is raised by the defence but contested by the Crown in which a 
judge would be entitled to withdraw the charge of murder from the jury at the 
close of the evidence. [T]here is no legal principle that would prevent a judge 
from taking such a course if the proper criteria could be met. However, whilst 
that course is theoretically possible, we think that it would only be in very rare 
cases that the proper criteria would be satisfied. A trial judge would have to be 
satisfied that the evidence, both medical and factual, was such that no 
reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that the defendant had failed 
to prove [the defence]. In a case where the defence of diminished responsibility 
was being advanced by a defendant and was being actively challenged by the 
Crown, it seems to us highly unlikely that a trial judge could reasonably reach 
such a conclusion” (at [42]). 
 
Commenting on this, Davis LJ in Brennan observed that “It may well be the position… that 
the exercise of this power to withdraw… will only be in exceptional circumstances” but he 
noted that, ultimately, each case “must be decided on its own facts and circumstances” (at 
[67]). He concluded as follows: 
 
“We add, however, that in the light of the new provisions of s 2 as amended, 
with its significantly different structure and effect, pursuit by the prosecution of 
a charge of murder in the face of a defence of diminished responsibility which is 
unequivocally supported by reputable expert evidence but which is not 
contradicted by any prosecution expert evidence should, we venture to suggest, 
become relatively uncommon… Accordingly, where the Crown proposes to 
contest a defence of diminished responsibility the new provisions set out in s 2 
as amended should be taken as an encouragement for the Crown to adduce its 
own expert evidence to support its stance” (at [67]). 
 
 
